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Uzbekistan is one of only two double-landlocked countries in the world located in 
Central Asia, north of Afghanistan and south of Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan means the 
land of Uzbeks (Stan – land).  It is the most populous country in Central 
Asia/Turkestan and is a double landlocked country that borders on all the former 
Soviet Central Asian republics.  Located at the heart of Central Asia, much of the 
region’s infrastructure – roads, railroads, transmission lines, and pipelines -- goes 
through Uzbekistan, offering it a unique opportunity to expand its exports with 




Tashkent (Toshkent in Uzbek means the city of stones: Tosh – stone, kent – city) - 
the largest city in Central Asia with population of approximately 2.5 million. 
Tashkent is the only city in the region with a well developed metro system.1 
 
 
INDEPENDENCE FROM THE USSR 
 
September 1, 1991 is celebrated as Independence Day. Uzbekistan did not struggle 
for independence but rather received it as a result of Boris Yeltsin’s victory over 
Mikhail Gorbachev and Yeltsin’s “Russia alone” vision. The Uzbek government was 
opposed to fragmenting the Union. 
 
It is important to note that Uzbeks were united in one country comparatively 
recently - in 1924 when the Bolsheviks created the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic 
(present day Uzbekistan) under National Delimitation Act which incorporated three 





Total: 447,400 sq km (slightly larger than California) 
Water: 22,000 sq km Land: 425,400 sq km 
Uzbekistan borders all four Central Asia States and Afghanistan: Border length 
with Kazakhstan: 2203 km 
Border length with Turkmenistan: 1621 km Border length with Tajikistan: 1161 km 




1 The first metro station in Tashkent was built in 1970. See the current map of the Tashkent metro 






SIGNIFICANT TOPOGRAPHIC FEATURES 
 
The country has a diverse landscape, although nearly 80 percent of the territory is 
covered by the Qizilqum Desert in the north-central region. Uzbekistan’s most 
fertile and populated region is the Ferghana Valley located in the north-east and 
divided from the rest of the Republic by the Kamchik pass. The eastern part of the 
country is in close proximity to the Tian Shan mountains and is over 4,000 meters 
above sea level. The western part is divided from the rest of the country by the 
Turan Lowland.  The far north-west suffers from the soil salination, especially near 
the shrinking Aral Sea. In the northwest corner there is also soil contamination 
from buried nuclear waste and agricultural chemicals from the Soviet period. Major 






The total length of automobile roads is more than 183,000 km out of which 42,530 
km are highways. Ninety four percent of roads are asphalt concrete.17 
 
The capital city is well connected to all provincial capitals and to neighboring 
countries. By 2000 the reconstruction of the road from Tashkent to Ferghana Valley 
through the Kamchik pass was completed and new asphalt was paved on the road 
linking the provinces of the Valley as well as Tashkent – Samarqand road. The 
government recently declared the start of a new project on reconstruction of Uzbek 
part of the international road from the town of Beyneu (Kazakhstan) to China via 
Kungrad, Bukhara, Samarqand, Tashkent, Andijan (Uzbekistan), Osh (Kyrgyzstan) 
into four lanes freeway. The cost of the project is US$ 2.6 billion. 
 
Despite the investment into new strategic road the overall condition of roads across 
the country has deteriorated due to lack of funding for maintenance. 
 
INTERNAL ROADS 
National Civil Aviation and Airport Infrastructure 
The government of Uzbekistan has heavily invested into reconstruction of national 
airports bringing them up to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
standards. The government has also developed the national air lines company, 
“O’zbekiston Havo Yollari” (Uzbekistan Airways). The fleet includes: Boeing 757-
200, Boeing 767-300-ER, A 310-300, RJ85, ТU-154, IL114 -100, IL 76- TD. The 
airline flies to major destinations in Europe, Asia, Middle East and to 
New York City, USA.2 
																																								 																				








In late 2008 Uzbekistan Airways signed a contract to purchase 4 new A320 




Though often overlooked as an energy source, Uzbekistan has substantial 
hydrocarbon reserves of its own and produces about as much natural gas as 
Turkmenistan.  The construction of oil and gas pipelines to export energy resources 
has become a strategic goal for the government. The majority of government 
revenue is from raw material exports. Uzbekistan has huge proven natural gas 
reserves and is the 8th largest natural gas producer. The current major gas pipeline 
runs to Russia. 
 
Russian Prime Minister Putin’s visited Tashkent to seal a new deal allowing the 
Russian company Gazprom to build a new natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan 
through Uzbekistan. The major obstacle in negotiations, the price, was overcome. 
Russia agreed to pay the price for natural gas demanded by Turkmens and Uzbeks. 
According to the agreement, 30 billion cubic meters will be shipped annually at the 
price set by a European gas pricing formula (reports indicated $300 per 1000 cu 
meters). By late 2008, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were paid $150 and $160 
respectively for 1000 cu meters of natural gas. 
 
In July 2008, Uzbekistan and China began construction on a new gas pipeline 
supply route to China. It was completed in late 2009 and provides 30 billion cubic 
























Map of Oil and Gas Pipelines 
 
 
Source: http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/pipelines.htm  
 
Railroads 
The construction of railroads in Central Asia began when the Russians built the 
Trans-Caspian railroad in 1880. They began construction to satisfy her thirst for 
natural resources and raw materials. In 1888, the railroad reached Samarqand and 
in 1899 Tashkent and then the Ferghana Valley.3 In 1906, the Tashkent – 
Orenburg railroad connected Uzbekistan directly with 
Russia. Even today the railroad actively takes passengers and cargo from 
Uzbekistan to major cities of Russia.4 
 
Today the railroads connect the capital city of Tashkent with provincial capitals in 
																																								 																				
3 The official web site of “Uzbekiston Temir Yollari” (Uzbekistan Railroads) in Uzbek and Russian  is 
http://www.uzrailway.uz  






the country. The railroad also leads out of the countries to the Tajik cities of 
Kurg’an -Tube, Khujand, Kulab and Dushanbe, Russian cities of Moscow, Saratov, 
Novosibirsk, Ufa and Saint- Petersburg and lead to Kazakh city of Almaty and town 
of Beyneu, and Turkmen cities of Dashoguz and Türkmenabat (formerly 
Chardzhou).5 
 
Cargo trains constructed after the Soviets left connect Uzbekistan to China, Iran, 
Afghanistan and other regional countries. In March of 2009 the Uzbek State 
Company “Uzbekiston Temir Yollari” (Uzbekistan Railroads) signed a contract with 
Chinese “CSR Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Works” on purchase of 15 new electric 
trains. 
 
Total length of railways is 3,645 km. The “Uzbekiston Temir Yollari” employs 54.7 




Because Uzbekistan is double landlocked Uzbekistan, it has no sea ports. However 





The country has an extreme continental climate with low humidity. Southern 
regions have higher temperature than the northern ones.  Temperature in late 
December/early January may reach – 10 °C in the northern region 0 °C in the 






January 1 New Year 
March 8 International Women’s Day 
March 21 
Navrus (comes from ancient Zoroastrian 
tradition which many Central Asians 
mistakenly take for an Islamic New 
Year) 
May 1 International Labor Day 
																																								 																				
5 See the map of railways in Russia, CIS and Baltic republics at: 
http://www.parovoz.com/maps/supermap/index-e.html  







Day of Memory and Remembrance 
(previously celebrated as theVictory Day 
over Nazi Germany in the World War II) 
September 1 Independence Day (from the USSR) 
October 1 Teacher’s Day 
December 8 Constitution Day 
 
The dates of two Islamic holidays Ramazon hayiti (Eid al-Fitr in Arabic) and 





• The official language is Uzbek, a Turkic language with Arabic and Persian 
influences. There are major regional dialects such as Tashkent, Ferghana, 
Khorezm, and Qarshi. 
• Russian is widely used in major cities, amongst intelligentsia and political 
and business elites. It serves as the language of communication between 
ethnic groups. 
• Tajik (a dialect of Farsi) is used in Samarqand and Bukhara provinces. 
• Karakalpak is spoken in the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan. 
Karakalpak belongs to the Kypchak or north-western category of the Turkic-
Altaic family of languages, 
• English is in big demand, particularly among the youth. The major reasons 
for the demand are educational and professional opportunities abroad and 




There are nine years of compulsory education. In 1997 the government started the 
National Program of Personnel Training. Aimed at transforming the educational 
system to better meet the needs of the economy, the program and implementation 
process caused controversy among the public including educators. 
• There are 9,800 public schools with 5,707,000 students, and 463,100 teachers. 
• Uzbekistan offers free secondary special vocational education. Currently 
1,052 vocational colleges and academic lyceums employ 67,330 teachers and 
instructors for 627,200 students.7 
 
According to UNDP, Uzbekistan ranks amongst the most developed countries with 
																																								 																				







an education index of 0.92, compared to the world average of 0.77. The literacy rate 
is 99.3%8  Yet a third of the population lives in poverty. 
 
Despite the overall high level of education, after the demise of the Soviet Union the 
percentage of educated youth and the quality of education declined in rural areas. 
Educated workers, including teachers, left the villages in search of a better life in 
cities or abroad. Poverty and family demands force children drop out of school. In 
rural schools, 65% of teachers have secondary schooling compared to 96% in cities.9 
 
During the Soviet time, education was a key to success and transition into 
adulthood. For example, a bride’s parents would check the groom’s educational 
credentials before approving the marriage. Currently, parents are more concerned 
with job status than education. Education does not provide the same amount of 
financial security and social prestige as in the past. 
 
NUMBER OF HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
There are 64 higher education institutes or universities.10 
 
Each year higher educational institutions enroll on average 64,000 students. The 
number of students totaled 286,000 for the 2006-2007 academic year. In 2007, 
23,400 faculty members worked in higher educational institutions, of whom 30.1% 
are candidates for a doctoral degree and 6.5% hold doctoral degrees.11 
 
Despite an increase in the number of institutes and universities and the state 
educational reform implemented, the overall quality of education from elementary 
to collegiate education has deteriorated due to low teacher pay, lack of qualified 
educators, shortage of textbooks and equipment and corruption in the state 
educational system. A common practice is to pay for high marks either on mid-term 
exams or entrance exams into college. Furthermore, the President and Vice 
President positions at higher education institutions and school districts are for sale. 
 
Education is becoming less accessible to ordinary citizens. Even though free 
education is granted by the constitution, the opportunity for free education is quite 
limited and mostly granted to children of well-connected and rich parents. Thanks 
to cost associated with corrupted practices, tuition actually costs approximately US 
$1,000 a year while the average salary is about US $100 a month. 
 
																																								 																				
8 UNDP-Uzbekistan, ‘Uzbekistan: Matching Supply and Demand,” Tashkent 2007/08, p.27. Available 
at http://www.undp.uz/en/publications/publication.php?id=100  
9 ‘Welfare Improvement Strategy for Uzbekistan Paper,’ Tashkent, 2007, p.32. Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Uzbekistan_PRSP(Jan-2008).pdf  
10 For more information on higher and secondary special education see the portal of the government 
of Uzbekistan at http://www.gov.uz/en/ctx.scm?sectionId=119&contentId=1951  







A dean of a university in Tashkent calls this informal system “free education for 
those who are free of needs while others are paying for them.”12 In March 2009, the 
Administration for Education started a campaign to eliminate corruption by having 
teachers sign declarations promising not to take bribes. Educators doubt it will have 
any effect if wages are still low and hiring processes remain dishonest. 
 
 
OCCUPATION OF POPULATION 
 
Major: Agriculture (cotton, grains, fruits and vegetables); agricultural processing 
(primarily cotton, fruits and vegetables); trade. Construction and transportation 
industries are on the rise. 
Many men and a few women are migrant labors travelling primarily to Russia and 
Kazakhstan and also to Europe, South Korea and the United States. According to 
statistics from Russian immigration services, migrants from Uzbekistan outnumber 
other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States.13 As of 2007, 80% of 
Uzbekistan’s labor migrants work in Russia. 
EBRD representative for Uzbekistan stated money transfers made up about 9 
percent of Uzbekistan's gross domestic product.14 Russia hit by global economic 
turmoil plans to cut labor migrant quotas for the next year which will result in a 
higher level of unemployment. The government could tackle this by offering less 
restrictive economic policies instead of relying on authoritarian methods of 
prosecuting social discontent. 
 
 
CROPS, FARMING AND LIVESTOCK 
Cotton is the country’s primary cash crop. However because of food security, water 
shortage and environmental problems the government ordered an increase in the 
farmable area dedicated to cereals. The major cereals grown are wheat, corn, barley 
and rice. The northwest corner of the country suffers from soil salination, especially 
near the Aral Sea. Uzbekistan is famous for its fruits. Farmers profit by exporting 
fruits to Russia in large quantities despite the government’s attempts to keep fruits 
in country and set prices. 
 
Livestock: Sheep, cattle, and goats are raised. Karakul sheep are famous for their 
black wool, which is used to produce hats (President Karzai of Afghanistan typically 
wears a Karakul hat). 
 
																																								 																				
12 E-mail correspondence with CCS, November 2008. 
13 E. Scherbakova, ‘Registriruemiy migratsionniy prirost naseleniya Rossii’ (Registered migration 
increase of Russia’s population). Available at: http:// 
www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2007/0303/barom05.php  










From recent data: 
Hospitals: 1,15015 
Hospital Beds Average: 4.4 beds/1,000 population 
Physicians: 2.53 physicians/1,000 population16 
 
Despite an adequate quantity of medical personnel the major challenge to the 
health care sector is poor quality, poorly qualified personnel and lack of equipment 
and supplies. Patients have to pay for medications, better treatment, and for certain 
operations due to lack of funding for personnel’s wages and medical supplies. 
 
The growing rates and types of diseases are underreported which is a legacy of 
Soviet times when the government would report only positive events in the mass 
media and hide negative developments. Drug trafficking via Uzbekistan from 
Afghanistan has enlarged the number of drug users contributing to a rise of HIV 
infected. 
The corruption in higher education leads to a shortage of qualified medical 
personnel due to the low quality of professional education in medical institutes and 
nurse schools. A lot of non-Uzbek doctors left the country in 1990’s. 
 
The poverty, particularly in rural areas, resulted in a rise of health problems that 
largely impacts woman and children. Drinking water pollution is a major factor 
behind rapidly growing cases of dysentery, cholera, typhoid, hepatitis, and various 
types of cancer. 
 
The intentional spread of tuberculosis among political (particularly religious) 
prisoners in penitentiary system of Uzbekistan has led to a spill-over of the disease 
when some prisoners were released or visited by relatives. The plan of 
“tuberculosisation” of religious prisoners was aimed at creating the picture that 
dissidents die “naturally,” not from killing and torturing by police to ensure no 





As of 2015, the total population equaled 31,190,000.17 The population of Uzbekistan 
																																								 																				
15 Information on healthcare  is obtained from the official web site of the "Uzbekistan in Figures - 
UinF" which is a result of joint efforts of UNDP Country Office and Center for Economic Research in 
Tashkent, 
Available at:http://www.statistics.uz/data_finder/2451/  
16 CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html  






is almost half of the total population of Central Asia (nearly 60 million) and 2nd 
highest level of increase of population in Newly Independent States after 
Tajikistan. For instance, the population density in Andijan province is higher than 
in Moscow province. Uzbekistan also has the highest population density in Central 
Asia. Nine percent of the total population lives on 1% of total area.  About 64% of 
the population resides in rural areas.18 In rural areas there is a much higher birth 
rate than urban areas, and presently 64% of the countryside population is under the 
age of 30.19 
 
COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION 
Although the Government of Uzbekistan for political reasons has not conducted 
a national demographic census since independence, the most accurate numbers are: 
80% - Uzbeks; 5.5% - Russians; 5% - Tajiks and Ironiy (descendants from Persia); 
3% - Kazakhs; 2.5% - Karakalpaks; 1.5% - Tatars; 2.5% - Kyrgyz, Turkmens, Jews, 
Ukrainians and others.20 
 
Results of the Last Official Census in 1989 

















																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
indicators  
18 ‘Welfare Improvement Strategy for Uzbekistan Paper,’ Tashkent, 2007. According to this report, 
approximately 32% of the workforce is employed in the agricultural sector. 24% of the gross domestic 
product of Uzbekistan  is produced in the agricultural sector. Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Uzbekistan_PRSP(Jan-2008).pdf  
19 ‘Uzbekistan – kluchevoi partnor v Tsentralnoi Azii’ (Uzbekistan – key partner in Central Asia), 
press release of the Embassy of Uzbekistan in People’s Republic of China, January 31, 2009. 
Available at: 
http://www.embassy-uz.cn/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=555  













MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS 
Uzbeks 
Historical divide along the regional lines among Uzbeks in pre-Soviet period have 
been an important factor in the power struggles among Uzbek elites during the 
Soviet and ex-Soviet period. Although President Karimov heavily relied on the 
Samarqand –Bukhara regional clan in early stages of his presidency, he later 
realized the importance of recruiting followers across the country. President tried to 
gain the support of all regional clans in order to hold power. Many Uzbeks were 
angered that Karimov gave key position to many representatives of Samarqand clan 
of Tajik ethnic origin. A fast learner of strategy and a great admirer of Nikolo 
Makyaveli’s Prince, Karimov demands personal loyalty regardless of ethnicity or 
regional identity if one seeks an important position in the government. 
 
City-Rural Divide: 
There is a definite tension between rural and urban Uzbek populations in 
Uzbekistan. For example, Tashkent locals complained to CCS that majority of 
police come from poor and less educated rural areas and towns outside of Tashkent 
and this fuels corruption.22 On the other hand, villagers used to survive on $1 dollar 
a day, are shocked to see the enormous wealth in Tashkent. “We feed the capital but 
get nothing in return besides brutal khakims (governors/mayors) who beat and 
curse us,” admitted a resident of Marhamat town in Andijan province.23 
 
Ethnic Uzbek Diasporas in Neighboring Countries as an External Threat to Regime 
of President Karimov: 
There is a significant number of ethnic Uzbek s residing in neighboring countries. 
These groups historically belonged to Uzbek khanates before their territories were 
given to neighboring Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan by the 
soviets. 
 
Afghanistan’s ethnic Uzbeks make up about 8 percent of the total population. They 
mostly reside in northern Afghanistan. Outside Central Asia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China and Russia are also home to smaller 
Uzbek diasporas. The number of immigrants to the United States is on the rise, 
particularly after 1995 when the economic situation drastically deteriorated. Many 
																																								 																				
21 Data is obtained from the ‘Umid Foundation’ established and funded by the Government of 
Uzbekistan. Available at http://www.umid.uz/Main/Uzbekistan/Population/population.html  
22 CCS’s phone interviews with a dozen of residents of Tashkent in February – March 2009. 






students decided to stay in the U.S. and are either illegal immigrants or naturalized 
citizens. Some tourists did the same. Thus far in 2009 3,284 citizens of Uzbekistan 
have won the lottery and immigrated to the U.S.24 Today, the largest Uzbek 
communities are located in Parsippany, NJ, Brooklyn, NY,  Los Angeles and San 
Francisco, CA, Nashville, TN, Philadelphia, PA. 
 
Uzbeks of Kyrgyzstan: 
A journalist and editor from Voice of America, Alisher Saipov, an ethnic Uzbek 
from Osh was killed before the last presidential elections in Uzbekistan. He was 
known for his criticism of President Karimov. He was offered money from the 
National Security Service in exchange for his silence. In 2005, he was warned by the 
Uzbek secret service that unless he stopped criticizing the Uzbek government he 
might face the worst outcome.25 
 
In 2007, Saipov decided to run against President Karimov and was killed shortly 
thereafter.26 His murder was a clear signal to Uzbek opposition that the regime in 
Tashkent is willing to employ any means to eliminate threats. 
 
In August 2006, the Kyrgyz security service officers shot a famous imam Rafiq Qori 
Kamoluddin, an ethnic Uzbek preacher whose mosque attracted up to 10,000 people 
at a Friday prayer. Officials in Kyrgyzstan accused the renowned imam in 
membership in Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan on the basis of intelligence they 
obtained from the Uzbek government.27Qori Kamoluddin was known for his 
tolerance of Hizb-ut-Tahri and criticisms of Karimov’s foreign policy and internal 
politics. Imam Qori Kamoluddin was warned several times by the Uzbek National 
Security Service agents to stop criticizing the regime in Tashkent.28 When 
Kurmanbek Bakiev became president of Kyrgyzstan the situation in Kyrgyzstan 
changed: in order to ensure continued gas supplies from Uzbekistan Bakiev clapped 
down on Uzbekistan’s dissidents. Previously Uzbekistan cut the gas supply to 
Kyrgyzstan every winter. Bakiev’s bias against ethnic Uzbeks and his repressive 
policies will lead to negative consequences for both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. 
 
Many Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan still remember and can’t forgive that 
Karimov stopped the thousands of Uzbeks crossing into Kyrgyzstan to defend fellow 




24 See ‘Green Card Lottery Results, at the http://greencardlottery.visapro.com/Green-Card-Lottery- 
Results.asp  
25 CCS interview with Alisher Saipov in Osh in July 2005. 
26 For instance read ‘Dissidents live in fear after Uzbek murder,’ by Imre Karacs, TimesOnLine, 
October 27, 2008. Available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article2753584.ece  
27 ‘Kyrgyzstan: Prominent Imam Killed In Security Raid,’ by Gulnoza Saidazimova, RFE/RL, August 
07, 2006. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1070381.html  






Karakalpak translates into black hat (kara – black, kalpak – hat). Karakalpaks are 
Sunni Muslims and are culturally closer to Kazakhs than Uzbeks. Traditionally 
Karakalpaks practiced exogamy but it was normal to marry a man or a woman from 
another clan of the same tribe. 
 
The exact number of Karakalpaks is unknown given that the last population census 
in Uzbekistan was in 1989. Various sources cite the total number is between 
560,000 - 600,000 in Uzbekistan and abroad. Karakalpaks comprise only one third 
of the total population of the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan. 
 
The Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan: 
As a political administrative unit Karakalpakstan (size of Oklahoma) was formed 
in 1925 as autonomous region. In 1936, it was transferred to the jurisdiction of the 
Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic as the autonomous republic. 
 
Map of the Karakalpakstan Autonomous Republic 
 
Source: http://karakalpak.com/stan.html  
 
There are separatist sentiments among some Karakalpaks who either call for 
creation of an independent state or uniting with Kazakhstan. The region has large 
oil and gas reserves. In 2008 the Russian corporation Gazprom drilled the well in 
the Tajenkazgan field in Karakalpakstan which is estimated to hold 14.9 billion 
cubic meters of gas. Inspired by the potential for economic development, the 






The government of Uzbekistan will not allow any section of the country to secede, 
particularly an energy rich area, constituting 37% of total area of Uzbekistan (see 
the map below). 
 
 




Various sources estimate about a million ethnic Russians reside in Uzbekistan. 
During the years after independence every third Russian left the country. Most of 
Russians reside in major cities, primarily in Tashkent. The first wave of emigration 
started in 1989 and during the early years of independence. Inter-ethnic clashes in 
the Ferghana Valley during Gorbachov’s political relaxation period and the 
“Russians, go back home” campaign during early years of independence forced more 
than 20% of Russians to leave Uzbekistan. 
 
After the nationalist sentiments among ethnic Uzbeks cooled down, Russians did 
feel threatened by rising unemployment and low wages. These two factors started a 
second wave of emigration in the late 1990s. 
 
Worsening socio-economic conditions, corruption, police abuse and lack of 
opportunities for employment continues motivating many Russians to depart 
Uzbekistan. 
 
Uzbekistani - Russian relations influence the Uzbek government policy towards 
ethnic Russians of Uzbek citizenship. The improved relations between the two 
countries led to the opening of Russian cultural centers, establishing departments of 
Russian at universities, Russian theater, etc. 
 
Unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan has never been threatened by Russian Diaspora of 
Uzbekistani nationality and no tensions between Russians and Uzbeks took place, 
with the exception of a few “Russian neighbor, go home!” statements. Karimov has 
been suspicious of ethnic Russians working in the government and particularly in 
the security apparatus. Russia has never indicated she would protect ethnic 
Russians in Uzbekistan. Ethnic Russians have dealt with the unique challenges of 
becoming marginal in the country they previously governed. 
 






The Tajiks mainly reside in the cities of Samarqand and Bukhara, the border area 
with Tajikistan and some districts of the Ferghana Valley. The Ironiy are 
concentrated in Samarqand and Bukhara. The most famous representative of Ironiy 
is the former Communist Party apparatchik, the ‘godfather’ of President Karimov 
and head of Samarqand clan Ismail Zhurabekov whose nickname was ‘grey 
cardinal.’ 
 
Tajiks and Ironiy speak a Persian dialect. Most of Ironiy are Shia Muslims while 
Tajiks are Sunni Muslims of Hanafi School. 
 
Tajiks constitute the 2nd largest ethnic minority group after Russians. Most have 
lived in their current places of residence as long as their Uzbeks neighbors. 
Comparatively, Russians started gradually immigrating to the region after 1864. 
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s there was a period of strong nationalist and 
separatist aspirations among the Tajiks of Samarqand and Bukhara. However 
President Karimov’s repressive policy against Tajik nationalist and the 1992-97 
civil war in Tajikistan pacified the ambitions of Tajiks to re-unite with fellow 
Tajiks. 
 
Although officially ethnic Tajiks make up about 5% of the total population some 
Tajiks claim the percentage is 2-3 times higher. They explain the discrepancy 
through “Uzbekization,” a process when many Tajiks were forced to write their 
nationality as Uzbeks at the national censuses as early as 1926. 
 
Grievances among Tajiks in Uzbekistan have not manifested in political or military 
activity which could threaten the stability of the country. 
 
Many Uzbeks believe President Karimov is an ethnic Tajik and angry that he 
brought many members of the regional clan into power in Tashkent.  However most 
of Tajikistanis and ethnic Tajiks of Uzbekistan despise Karimov for his unfriendly 
relations with Tajikistan and for suppressing the cultural and/or political ambitions 
of the Samarqandi and Bukhara Tajiks. 
 
The well known ethnic Tajiks serving/having served in administration of Karimov 
include: 
Prosecutor General: Buritosh Mustafoev 
Chairman of the Central Bank: Fayzullo Mullojonov 
Minister of Justice: A. Polvonzoda 
Minister of Finance: Mamarizo Nurmurodov Governor of Samarqand 
province: Alisher Mardiev. 
 
Kazakhs 






Kazakhstan. The most prominent incident took place in December 2001, when 
nearly 2,000 ethnic Kazakhs of Uzbek citizenship living in villages Turkestanets 
and Bagys declared the villages ‘the Kazakh Bagys Republic.’ 
 
Approximately 70,000 ethnic Kazakhs immigrated to Kazakhstan from 1991 to 
200129   and several thousands more Kazakh families left Uzbekistan after 
December 2001 under the repatriation program. According to Ambassador of 
Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan nearly 1.2 million ethnic Kazakhs resided in Uzbekistan 
as of August 2001. He announced 3,000 families planned to relocate to Kazakh 
republic.30 
 
The major reason for emigration is the worsening economy and lack of employment 
opportunities, especially in rural areas where most of Kazakhs reside. The 
conversion of land devoted to cattle breeding into cotton and cereal plantations 




Approximately 90,000 Jews resided in Samarqand, Bukhara and Tashkent until the 
dissolution of the USSR. By 2007, there were only 5,000 Jews remaining.31 Most of 






The government has not conducted the national census since 1989 and no religious 
identity polls have been conducted since independence. However, the Uzbek 
government claims 88% of the population consider themselves Muslim.32 The 
government body that monitors activities of religious institutions called the 
Committee on Religious Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers sets the state policy 
on religion. Despite the formal separation of religion and state, there is tight control 
and widespread suppression of religious freedoms.33 
 
																																								 																				
29 “Moya zagranichnaya rodina. Kak zhivotsa kazakham v Uzbekistane” (My abroad fatherland. How 
Kazakhs live in Uzbekistan), November 1, 2002. Available at: 
http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php4?st=1036133040  
30 “Ethnic Kazakhs Want to Leave Uzbekistan,” CACI Analyst, 29 August 2001, Available at: 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/584  
31 World Jewish Population 2007, American Jewish Yearbook, vol. 107 (2007), p. 592. Available at: 
http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/AJYB727.CV.pdf  
32 Embassy of Republic of Uzbekistan in the United Sates, PRESS-RELEASE: Religious Situation in 
Uzbekistan and Observance of Freedom of Faith in the Republic, November 29, 2006. Available at 
http://www.uzbekistan.org/press/archive/420/  






According to International Religious Freedom Report 2008, 2,228 religious 
organizations including 180 registered minority religious groups were registered 
with the Ministry of Justice of Uzbekistan:34 
• 2048 are Islamic organizations, including mosques, Islamic Institute, 
Tashkent Islamic University,35 the Spiritual Administration of Muslims (the 
muftiate)36 and maddrassas. Shias constitute about 1% of the population. 
• 58 Korean Christian, 
• 36 Russian Orthodox, 
• 23 Baptist, 
• 21 Pentecostal ("Full Gospel"), 
• 10 Seventh-day Adventist, 
• 8 Jewish organizations, 
• 5 Roman Catholic, 
• 6 Baha'i, 
• 4 "New Apostolic," 
• 3 Lutheran 
• 2 Armenian Apostolic, 
• 1 Jehovah's Witnesses, 1 Krishna Consciousness group, 
• 1 Temple of Buddha, 
• 1 Christian "Voice of God" Church; 
 
The Ferghana Valley became the center of religious political and social activism in 
the country. Three provinces of Uzbek part of the Valley differ in religiosity. 
 
Ferghana city built by Russians as a fortress in 1876 is most European but the 
Ferghana province itself is traditional and religious. Andijan city and the province 
as a whole are more traditional and religious than Ferghana city. The Akramiya 
movement became a confronter of the state when the government troops killed 
hundreds of people at the central square in Andijan. Famous imam Abduvali qori 
preached in his mosque in downtown Andijan.  He inspired practicing Muslims who 
were displeased with corruption, chaos and police abuse. He was kidnapped by the 
government in 1995. 
 
Namangan city and the whole province is the champion enforcer of Sharia law. Both 
Juma Namangani and Tohir Yoldash, leaders of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 
came from Namangan. The streets of Namangan are almost completely empty 
during Iftar and Tarawih prayer in the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. During the 
Iftar, you can see some people in Andijan and many young residents of Ferghana 
city on the streets. One can easily observe a number of women wearing the hijab - 
Namangan has the highest percentage with Andijan and Ferghana following the 
																																								 																				
34 International Religious Freedom Report 2008: Uzbekistan,  the Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor. Available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108509.htm  
35 The web site of the university:  http://www.tiu.uz/eng/index.php  






list.  But one thing the Westerner might be surprised not to see in Uzbekistan – 
beards. They are unofficially banned for young and mid-age males unless those men 
are imams. The beard is viewed as a sign of religious piety which the government of 
President Karimov tries very hard to exterminate. 
 
Karakalpakstan is considered the least religious region. The nomadic lifestyle of 
scattered populace prevented Islam from spreading as much as it did in urban parts 
of the country. 
 
Bukhara and Samarqand produced many scholars like Imam Bukhari, Al-Beruni, 
Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and al - Farabi and had huge libraries well known around the 
Muslim world. The cities are known as centers of Islamic and secular scholarship. 
Modern day Bukhara and Samarqand are more traditional than religious due to the 
killing of a hundred of clergymen by the Bolsheviks in the 1920’s. 
 
Other provinces are not particularly religious and follow local traditions. For 
instance, old Uzbek women dancing with men and drinking vodka at the wedding or 
birthday party might be not an unusual thing in Khorezm but unacceptable in 





Uzbekistan consists of the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan and 12 
provinces37 which include 162 districts and 118 towns. 
 
Administrative Units (in sq. km., Uzbek spelling) 
Administrative Unit Area (in sq. km.) Capital City 
Qoraqalpag’iston Respublikasi 160,000 Nukus 
Navoiy Viloyati 110,800 Navoiy 
Buxoro Viloyati 39,400 Buxoro 
Qashqadaryo Viloyati 28,400 Qarshi 
Surxondaryo Viloyati 20,800 Termez 
Jizzax Viloyati 20,500 Jizzax 
Samarqand Viloyati 16,400 Samarqand 
Toshkent Viloyati 15,300 Toshkent 
Namangan Viloyati 7,900 Namangan 
Farg’ona Viloyati 6,800 Farg’ona 
Xorazm Viloyati 6,300 Xorazm 
Sirdaryo Viloyati 5,100 Guliston 
																																								 																				














President of Republic of Uzbekistan 
 
LIST OF MEMBERS OF CABINET OF MINISTERS AND CHAIRPERSONS 
AS OF 2016 
 
Shavkat Miromonovich Mirziyoev 
Prime Minister 
 
Rustam Sadikovich Azimov 








Batir Irkinovich Zakirov 






Gulomjon Inomovich Ibragimov 











Ulugbek Ubaydullaevich Rozukulov 






Adkham Ilkhamovich Ikramov 






Galina Karimova Saidova 
Minister of Economy 
 
Aziz Abdukakharovich Abdukhakimov 






Bakhodir Madjitovich Akhemedov 






Adkham Akramovich Akhmedbaev 
Minister of Internal Affairs 
 
Abdulaziz Khafizovich Kamilov 







Elyor Majidovich Ganiev 
Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, 
Investments and Trade 
 
Kabul Raimovich Berdiev 








Alisher Vasikovich Vakhobov 







Ulugbek Ilysovich Inoyatov 
Minister of Public Education 
 
Shukhrat Jurakulovich Teshayev 






Muzraf Mubarakxodjaevich Ikramov 






Anvar Valievich Alimov 











Tursinkhon Aydarovich Khudayberganov 






Khurshid Mirsabirovich Mirzakhidov 
Minister of Development of Information 
Technologies and Communications 
OFFICIAL POLITICAL PARTIES 
• O'zbekiston Liberal Demokratik Partiyasi (Liberal Democratic Party of 
Uzbekistan), chairman - Adham Shamdmanov; 
• O'zbekistan Xalq Demokratik Partiyasi (People's Democratic Party of 
Uzbekistan),  chairman - Asliddin Rustamov; 
• Fidokorlar Milliy Demokratik Partiyasi (National Democratic Party of Self- 
Sacrificers), chairman - Ahtam Tursunov; 
• O'zbekistan Milliy Tiklanish Demokratik Partiyasi (National Rebirth 
Democratic Party of Uzbekistan), chairman - Hurshid Dosmuhammedov; 
• Adolat Sotsial Demokratik Partiyasi (Justice Social Democratic Party) 
chairwoman - Dilorom Toshmuhamedova 
 
All five political parties in Uzbekistan were created by the government in order to 
produce the image of political plurality and mature democracy to please foreign 
observers. These parties have no public support and membership is mandatory. 
 
Since all official parties are subservient to the executive branch, the 2009 
parliamentary elections will present no new candidates. According to December 
2008 amendments to the Constitution, the 150 seats lower chamber of the 
parliaments is occupied by officially recognized parties and the Ecological 
Movement of Uzbekistan. 
 
SECULAR OPPOSITION PARTIES (DENIED REGISTRATION BY THE 
GOVERNMENT) 
 
The Ministry of Justice provides registration documents to a political party before 
they can legally function. Opposition parties are banned and their members are 
imprisoned and harassed. It is difficult to know the size of opposition parties due to 
the ban on their activities and parties claim popular support and large membership. 
 
Birlik Halq Xarakati Partiyasi38 (Party of Unity People’s Movement) 
Chiarman - Abdurahim Polat 
General Secretary – Vasila Inoyat 
																																								 																				







This party has never been registered by authorities. Its leaders had to flee the 
country to avoid imprisonment and torture. One leader, Abdurahim Polat has been 
residing in the United States since 1992. He has escaped murder attempts. 
 
Democratic “Erk” (Freedom) Party of Uzbekistan  
Chairman – Muhammad Salih39 
 
Erk is a splinter party of the Birlik (Unity) People’s Movement established in 1990. 
The party has been denied registration by the government. Muhammad Salih was 
the only alternative candidate to run in the first presidential elections on December 
29, 1991. 
 
Currently, Muhammad Salih is the major opposition figure to the regime. The party 
gained a lot of support among Uzbekistani students who studied in Turkey in the 
1990s until the Uzbek government ordered them to return. A few years ago Mr. 
Salih received asylum in Norway when he left Turkey. Turkey had been under 
pressure from the Uzbek government to extradite Mr. Salih. 
 




According to the constitution, Uzbekistan is a secular state and no parties with a 
religious platform may legally function. 
 
O’zbekiston Islom Harakati (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) 
Military leader - Juma Namangani 
Previous Soviet name: Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojayev 
 
Namangani was born in the Hodja village of Namangan province on 12 June, 1969. 
He was killed in Afghanistan during the U.S. operation “Enduring Freedom” in 
November 2001. Political leader Tohir Abduhalilovich Yoldashev was born in 
Namangan province on October 2, 1968. Yoldashev (most frequently used aliases: 
Muhammad Tahir Farooq, Qori Tohir, Tahir Jann). 
 
																																								 																				
39 Personal web site of Muhammad Salih: http://www.muhammadsalih.info/  







Photo of Tohir Abduhalilovich Yoldashev 
 
The goal of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is to overthrow the 
government of President Karimov and establish an Islamic state based on Sharia 
law and eventually spread Sharia laws over Central Asia. 
 
The party was formally established in 1998 in Kabul, Afghanistan by Juma 
Namangani and Tohir Yoldash.41 Its associates included former members of small 
local Islamist groups in Ferghana Valley such as “Adolat Uyushmasi” (Association 
of Justice), “Islom Lashkarlari” (Warriors of Islam), and “Tovba” (Repentance). 
During the 1990’s Uzbeks who were victimized by religious prosecution conducted 
by the government and disillusioned by corruption joined the IMU. 
During the civil war in Tajikistan, the IMU supported the anti-Communist 
government coalition of Islamists and democratic forces. The Tavildara Valley 
became a new home for future IMU. Amid the peace accord signed in 1997, the 
Uzbek militants were under the pressure of former Tajik comrades to leave the 
country. The organization fled to Afghanistan in November of 1999 where it earlier 
established close links with all international Jihadist organizations and sponsors. 
IMU embraced Al-Qaida’s ideology and supported Taliban; Mazar-e Sharif, Kondo’z, 
and Taloqan became their strongholds in Afghanistan. Some Arabs, Uyghurs and 
citizens of former Soviet Union joined the organization. 
 
The IMU has been active throughout Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The 
group operates largely in the Ferghana Valley on the Uzbek/Kyrgyz border where it 
receives support and some protection from local inhabitants. The IMU purportedly 
has military bases in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and a "forward base of operations" in 
Batken, Kyrgyzstan.  Location/Area of Operation: Militants are scattered 
																																								 																				








throughout South Asia, Tajikistan, and Iran. Area of operations includes 
Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The last few 
years have seen much of the IMU decimated.  
 
 
Post 9/11 Situation 
A significant blow to leadership, manpower and capability of the IMU occurred in 
November of 2001 when the coalition forces bombed the IMU militants along with 
their military commander Juma Namangani. 
 
After the killing of Namangani, the IMU split into two distinct groups. 
Approximately 500 remain loyal to Tohir Abduhalilovich Yoldashev and the rest 
belong to Islamic Jihad Union.42 
 
Approximately 500 Central Asian men and their families linked to IMU, who did 
not get along well with Tohir Yoldash or did not want to continue fighting, migrated 
to Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Middle East countries. More than one hundred IMU 
members stayed in Afghanistan after the attacks of Coalition forces. A small 
number of Central Asian militants decided to take a risk and return home.43 
 
The remaining troops and their political leader Tohir Yoldash escaped into the 
North and South Waziristan in Federal Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. The 
exact number of active fighters in Pakistan is unknown but believed to be between a 
few hundred to a thousand. Most of these have been killed in recent years. 
 
Central Asian militants experienced rough times in the tribal border region of 
Pakistan. Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan, 
supported Central Asian, Chechen and Uygur fighters against Mullah Nazir’s Wazir 
tribe. The Wazir tribe were resisting the presents of foreigners on their lands. The 
conflict between Mullah Nazir’s tribe and Baitullah Mehsud’s forces occupied 
jihadists from the Commonwealth of Independent States in 2007 and 2008. 
 
Since 2005 Central Asian news agencies frequently report IMU involved in terrorist 
activities throughout Central Asia. Several members were detained in Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and a large amount of weapons and ammunition were 
found in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. IMU members planned terrorist attacks in 
Tajikistan in 2007 but were caught by law enforcement.44 
																																								 																				
42 Bill Roggio, ‘Spinning the Fighting in South Waziristan, April 24, 2007, The Long War Journal. 
Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/04/daveed_gartensteinro.php  
43 Information was obtained in August 2007, CCS email communication with Alisher Saipov, a 
famous Uzbek journalist of Voice of America from Osh, Kyrgyzstan, who is believed to be shut by the 
security 
services of Uzbekistan in October of 2007. 
44 Caucaz.com, Tajikistan Detains Seven IMU Suspects, July 23, 2007. Original source: RFE/RL 







The Uzbek government regularly jails practicing Muslims accusing them of 
membership in extremist groups, including IMU. For example on March 12, 2009 
eight alleged members of IMU were sentenced to 5 years in prison. The Uzbek 
authorities are often accused of confusing religious piety with extremism. 
 
Due to the unique combination of structural problems: prosecution of practicing 
Muslims, a lack of religious freedoms, poverty, corruption, abuses by the law 
enforcement and mismanagement, a small number of the population continue to 
sympathize with IMU. 
 
Islomiy Jihod Ittihodi (Islamic Jihad Union)45 
The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) is a splinter group of IMU founded in 2002 in the 
Waziri tribal area of FATA, Pakistan. 
 
The founders of IJU: 
• Najmiddin Fatilloevich Jalolov (alias: Abu Yahya Muhammed Fatih; born in 
1972, lived in Hartum village of Andijan province in Uzbekistan; was on 
Uzbek government wanted list since March 1999 after a Tashkent bombings) 
 
 
Photo of Abu Yahya Muhammed Fatih, commander of IJU. 
• Suhayl Kamolidinovich Buranov (alias: Mansur Buranov, Mansur Sohail, 
Abu Huzaifa; born in 1983, in Tashkent city of Uzbekistan) 
 
The reason for creating a new organization was the gradual internationalization of 
the IMU. By accepting foreign jihadists, IJU became a Turkic and European 
speaking organization with military and training objectives all over the world. 
Although the leadership of IJU consists of Uzbeks, the rank and file included 
Germans, Chechens, Central Asians, Pakistanis, Slavs and Uyghurs. The members 
view themselves as a part of global jihad against all enemies of Islam, firstly United 
States and Israel, rather than only focusing on Central Asia. 
 
IJU has close ties with Al-Qaida, the Haqqani network and other pan-Islamist 
jihadist organizations. 
																																								 																				







According to Guido Steinberg, a former counterterrorism adviser to the German 
government, the Islamic Jihad Union has no more than 200 followers.46 
 
IJU claimed responsibility for the May 26 suicide attack on a police officer on Fitrat 
Street in Andijan City and assault on police check point and clashed with the Uzbek 
law enforcement units in the town of Khanabad located near the Kyrgyz-Uzbek 
border and 80 km from Andijan which suffered government repressions in spring of 
2005. Prior to this incident, two IJU militants were arrested in Afghanistan. 
Pakistan military’s assault on Taliban in jihadists’ stronghold FATA area pushed 
IJU to undertake a new attack against President Karimov in the Ferghana Valley. 
Renewed attacks in Uzbekistan are likely an effort of IJU to garner financial 
support from global terror sponsors. 
 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s goal is to rebuild the single Islamic Kilafah State (Caliphate) 
through propagation and peaceful transformation of Muslim society into the ‘Islam 
Household’47 The radical party is predominantly Sunni and does not employ violent 
means but Central Asian governments have accused HT of terrorism. 
 
HT is anti-Western, anti-Semitic, anti-secular, considers democracy a Kufr system, 
and calls for overthrow of Muslim governments that do not obey the party’s vision of 
Islamic governance. 
 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir members first appeared in Central Asia in the mid-1990’s in 
Uzbekistan. The massive arrest campaign during the aftermath of the Tashkent 
bombings brought the unknown party in spotlight. The government blamed IMU 
and HT for the attacks. They arrested not only alleged members of these 
organizations but those known for religious piety. 
 
In 1999, Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s regular members openly criticized the unpopular 
government of Karimov and refused an offer to ask pardon from President Karimov. 
The refusal won support from many people who might not have shared the ideology 
of the organization. 
 
Although HT claims to be peaceful some members left the party and either joined 
the militant movements or created separate violent cells. HT is banned in all 
Central Asian states. 
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Hizb-ut-Tahrir, despite its early popularity, failed to become a popular movement 
due to highly secretive recruitment process, heavy repression, little interest in 
political Islam and theological discrepancies with mainstream Islamic doctrine. 
 
Differences in doctrine of Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama‘ah (majority of Muslims) and HT 
is a significant obstacle for broad public support and recruitment of new members. 
The frequency and quantity of leaflet distribution among populace in the region has 
decreased and the number of arrests of alleged members of HT has dropped 
indicating the party has lost ground in Central Asia in general and Uzbekistan in 
particular. 
 
Traditionally, HT was popular among ethnic Uzbeks. Besides Uzbekistan the 
organization was also active in the border areas of neighboring counties populated 
by ethnic Uzbeks. Currently the group is most active in the Kyrgyz and Tajik 
sections of the Ferghana Valley and southern regions of Kazakhstan. 
 









The clan system in Uzbekistan is based on regional set up of the country resulting 
from Bolsheviks’ conquer and unification of three Uzbek Khanates - Bukhoro, 
Khiva, and Qoqon in 1920s. 
 
Although the Soviet administration opposed traditional regional, tribal or family 
networks, they existed in Central Asian and became more powerful with the 
independence. In Uzbekistan, the clanship has been developed firstly on the 
regional basis. 
 
Today, the two most powerful regional clans are of Tashkent and Samarqand. 
However the clan has lost importance over time. The laws of the free market and 
economic profit supersede the loyalty to the clan. Another factor for diminishing 
importance of clanship is personal loyalty demanded by President Karimov. 
Currently the official positions are sold to the highest bidder while before the 
clanship was an important consideration for job appointment. 
 
By 1995, two powerful ministerial clans which competed for favors from the 
President’s office: National Security Service (NSS, formerly KGB) and Ministry of 






continue protecting the president and his family. The NSS has come as the winner 
of agency rivalry. The strength of the ministry allows the agency leadership to 
control all sectors of the economy such as cotton export or selling the license needed 
to run a business. 
 
PRESIDENT ISLAM KARIMOV 
When Islam Karimov became president of Uzbekistan he had little national support 
base as he previously was chosen by Gorbachov as a leader of Uzbekistan. 
 
The personal challenge of independence in 1991 for a new president was to 
consolidate his power. It was a difficult task because Gobachov strengthened 
opposition parties and religious groups. The first step towards widening Karimov’s 
support among the wealthiest and powerful figures was the government’s release of 
officials imprisoned during Andropov period for corruption.48 In doing so, Karimov 
decided to build the new country with hands of opportunists who had no principles 
but were thirsty for power and wealth.   In 1991, when Uzbekistan became an 
independent republic, Karimov had a historic chance to bring in reformers and 
appoint them to key positions while keeping the corrupt officials rightfully jailed by 
the Soviet regime behind bars. He did the opposite, painting Moscow’s anti-
corruption campaign as a crusade against all Uzbeks, President Karimov freed 
thieves and sold to them important positions. The best example is Ismail 
Zhurabokov, who Karimov appointed to the powerful Deputy Prime Minister 
Position. Zhurabokov was a top official in charge of cotton and irrigation in the 
Rashidov’s government famous for its corrupt practices of pripiska49 and paying 
bribes to Moscow patrons in politburo.50 Another example – retired Major General 
Ubaidulla Tazhihanov who was imprisoned, then released and appointed as chief of 
the Police Academy. Under his administrative between 1992 – 2004 future police 
cadets paid up to US$ 10,000 to “successfully” pass the entrance exams. Corruption 
flourished in the academy and the stories about bribes and price lists spread across 
the country.51 
 
Karimov could have built up a new reformed administration but relied on  corrupt 
and authoritarian ex-Communist apparatchiks as he had to rise to power through 
corrupt career building methods and he chose people like himself whose major goal 
was the consolidation of power and wealth for the President’s office.  Today, he is 
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51 2008- 09 pricelist of official position is as following: District mayor - from US$ 50,000 to 200,000 
depending on economic resources of district; City mayor - starting at US$ 100,000 depending on 
economic 
resources of city; Province governor – starting at US$ 500,000 depending on economic resources of 








considered one of the world’s most brutal dictators. 
 
FOREIGN MILITARY BASES 
 
QARSHI-KHANABAD (K2) AIR FIELD 
Former Soviet air base in support of the Soviet troops during the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan. Located in Khanabad, outskirts of the city of Qarshi, Qashqadaryo 
province, south of Uzbekistan, 125 miles north of the Afghan border.52 
 
In October of 2001 about 1,000 U.S. military troops landed at K2 Airbase which 
became a logistics base in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 
targeting Al-Qaida and Taliban. The air field is home to the 60th Separate Mixed 
Aviation Brigade of Uzbek Ministry of Defense. 
 
In November 2005, U.S. military personnel left the base. In May 2005 the U.S and 
EU governments criticized the killing of peaceful demonstrators in Andijan by  the 
Uzbek troops. In July, Karimov ordered Americans to vacate the air field.  
 
Uzbekistan is caught up between two major powers - Russia and United States 
which try to influence Karimov over the military bases. Karimov’s family and the 
regime are considered illegitimate at home and face harsh criticism internationally. 
Karimov believes the West may sponsor the internal revolt or mass revolution if he 
does not improve relationship with the United States.53 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL  SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE AIR 
TRANSPORT BASE IN TERMEZ 
The Termez city airport located at the border with Afghanistan, besides its primary 
use 
as a civilian airport, is being used as a base for German C-160 "Transalls" serving 
the German ISAF-contingent’s operation in Afghanistan.54 
 
Other NATO members also use the air base under ISAF – Afghanistan umbrella. 
 
German Foreign Ministry characterizes the base, called in German as 
Lufttransportstùtzpunkt 3, as a major element of the ISAF operation. It is from 
there that ISAF deploys medical teams for the rapid evacuation of sick and injured 
from Afghanistan.55 Germany uses the base for its air force combat wing of the 
																																								 																				
52 See Appendix 5 for the map of the K-2 base location. 
53 CCS’ interviews in Osh and Jalal- Abad in June-July of 2005. 
54 See Appendix 5 for the location of Termez 








Federal Armed Forces.56 
 
In March of 2008 the Uzbek government indicated American military personnel can 
use the base on a case-by-case basis and only within the NATO mission. 
 
Strategic Importance of Termez 
Located 5 km from Termez, the “Bridge of Friendship” across the Amu Daryo River 
is a strategic road and rail link between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. The road is 
used by the Coalition Forces to transport cargo to Afghanistan from the Baltic via 
Russia and Kazakhstan. The bridge was built by the Soviet Union in 1982 to supply 
the Red Army troops fighting the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. The bridge was closed 
in 1997 when the Taliban reached areas of northern Afghanistan in close proximity 
to Uzbekistan. The Friendship Bridge was re-opened on December 9, 2001 to deliver 
humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.                                          57 
 
Norway stopped using the Termez air base in early May after professor and senior 
researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Foreign Policy Daniel Heradstveit 
criticized the government for cooperation with a totalitarian regime of President 
Karimov.58 This move of the Norwegian Government was warmly welcomed by 
human rights defenders and opposition parties who viewed this decision of Norway 
as an example of firmness on the matter of human rights and democracy 
advancement in authoritarian countries. 
 
NAVOI CITY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 
Latitude 40° 5' 4N; longitude 65° 22' 45E, at an altitude of 382 meters. 
 
The airport located nearly 500 km from the Afghan border and connected by 
railroads and automobile freeways since May of 2009 and is used by the U.S. Air 
Force for transporting non-lethal cargo to Afghanistan. “Korean Air” which 
manages the Uzbek airport offered to transport the U.S. and NATO cargo for  their 
military operations in Afghanistan and Seoul became involved in re- constructing 
the airport into a modern air hub which is able to accept Boeing 747- 400s, Airbus 
300-600s or Ilyushin-76s cargo aircrafts and provide cargo services from Europe and 
the Unites STates to Afghanistan and other countries in Central and South-East 
Asia. 
 
The airport built in the outskirts of capital of Navoi province59 the city of Navoi in 
																																								 																				
56 The German Federal Foreign Office, ‘Uzbekistan: political relations,’ available at: 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Laenderinformationen/01-Laender/Usbekistan.html  
57  See images of the “Friendship Bridge” at the following links: 
http://static.panoramio.com/photos/original/1222396.jpg , http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys- 
images/Guardian/Pix/gallery/2002/01/10/uzbekistan.jpg  
58 “Norway drops use of controversial air base,” The Norway Post, May 8, 2009. Available at: 
http://www.norwaypost.no/content/view/21994/26/  






1962 has been renovated in 2004-07 and the Cabinet of Ministers issued the decree 
on August 21, 2008 providing the airport international status. In December of 2008 
the airport was handed over to the “Korean air” company to operate the airport 
which according to Koreans will become a large air logistic transcontinental center 
in Asia. 
 
By providing the airport for non-military airlifting operations the Government of 
Uzbekistan acquired a higher political leverage, financial gains from rent of the 
base and technical modernization of a provincial airport.  The Navoi International 
Airport is declared a free industrial-economic zone which will receive, process, 
distribute and transport services that will bring significant revenue to the state 
budget, provide jobs to locals, and raise the prestige of the country. 
SECURITY SITUATION 
 
President Karimov has been able to brutally eliminate all threats to his power and 
to preserve the stability of Uzbekistan, at least according to his desires. However, 
poverty is widespread; unemployment is high; wages are extremely low; torture is 
routine; police abuse and corruption are amongst the highest in the world. 
 
High-level government officials benefit from the system and are not interested in 
change. Lower level officials who have no access to financial resources are unhappy 
with the regime. There are no pressure groups inside the country capable of 
toppling the regime and there are no legal ways to dismiss the government. 
 
The only pressure group Karimov has been genuinely concerned about is the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and to a lesser extent Hizb-ut-Tahrir. IMU had 
been significantly damaged by the Coalition Forces in November 2001 and later 
during the anti-Taliban offensive. It is difficult to assess whether the organization 
is capable of launching a vigorous incursion into Uzbekistan. The potential 
restoration of Taliban could lead to revival of IMU and IJU which scares the 
government of Uzbekistan and other states of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO). 
 
Karimov’s willingness to cooperate with the west at times, especially relative to 
GWOT, has become a shield from criticism and sanctions for authoritarian regimes. 
 
TENSE RELATIONS WITH TAJIKISTAN EXACERBATE 
The governments of neighboring countries surely fear extremist organizations and 
are willing to cooperate with Uzbekistan but they are also discontented with 
President Karimov. Karimov ordered land mines planted along the borders of 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1999. He then bombed the territory of Tajikistan in 
the same year and cut air communication with Tajik cities. Border travel and trade 
restrictions impoverished local populations on both sides of the border, but enriched 







Uzbekistan’s energy and water use disagreements with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
frequent conflicts with border guards and long standing informal “cold war” against 
Tajikistan have led to a high level of tensions in the region. According to a Central 
Asian diplomat, Karimov is the main impediment for regional integration.60 
  
																																								 																				









The list of ISLAMIC JIHAD UNION in video: 
• IJU web site: 
http://www.sehadetzamani.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=2039  




• Attacking a Coalition base: 
http://www.dailymotion.com/relevance/search/attacking%252BUS%252BBas
e  
• Islamic Jihad Union Commander Mohammed Fateh on Goals of IJU: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WckBFFgPzB0  
• Badr al-Tawheed for Lal Masjid (2008): 
http://www.archive.org/details/Badr_al-Tawheed_for_Lal_Masjid  










LINKS TO NEWS AND RESOURCES ON UZBEKISTAN/CENTRAL ASIA 
 
News on Uzbekistan/Central Asia in English, Russian and Uzbek: 









Portal of the State Authority of the Republic of Uzbekistan 
http://www.gov.uz/  
 
Uzbekistan News National Agency 
http://uza.uz/en/  
 
Press service of President of Uzbekistan 
http://www.press-service.uz/#  
 
Business Informational Portal Uzreport 
http://www.uzreport.com/  
 










News on Uzbekistan/Central Asia in Russian: 
















FreeDoilnanet, radio news in Russian, Uzbek and Kyrgyz 
http://www.freedolina.net/  
 
Pravda Vostoka (offical news in Uzbek) 
http://www.pv.uz/?inc=1  
 
News on Uzbekistan/Central Asia in English: 






Institute for War & Peace Reporting 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=346738&apc_state=henprca  
 






Transitions On Line News 





Central Asia – Caucasus Institute Analyst 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/ 
 
News on Uzbekistan in Uzbek only: 
RFE/RL in Uzbek 
http://www.ozodlik.org/  
 
Voice of America in Uzbek 
http://www.amerikaovozi.org/  
 













Russian and Eurasian Security Network 
http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/sw/index.cfm  
 
National Bureau of Asian Research 
http://www.nbr.org/  
 
RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy 
http://www.rand.org/international_programs/capp/pubs/central.html  
 
OFFICIAL WEBSITES OF MINISTRIES, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION 
 
Regional International Organizations: 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
http://www.sectsco.org/  
 
Eurasian Economic Community 
http://www.evrazes.com/  
 




Oliy Majlis (parliament) 
http://www.parliament.gov.uz/en/ and http://www.senat.uz/  
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
http://mfa.uz/eng/  
 
State Committee on Statistics 
http://stat.uz/STAT/index.php?lng=1  
 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
http://www.mintrud.uz/default.php  
 








Ministry of Finance 
http://www.mf.uz/eng/  
 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (police) 
http://www.mvd.uz/  
 




Ministry of Higher and Secondary Special Education 
http://www.edu.uz/index.php  
 
Ministry of Public Education 
http://uzedu.uz/eng/  
 
Ministry of Health 
http://www.minzdr.uz/  
 
Ministry of Emergency 
http://mchs.uz/  
 
State Property Committee 
http://www.gki.uz/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1047&Itemid=15  
 






National Company «UZBEKTOURISM» 
http://www.uzbektourism.uz/en/  
 
State Committee on De-monopolization and Competition and Business Support 
http://www.antimon.uz/rus/index.php  
 
Committee on Religious Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers 
http://www.religions.uz/uzb/index.html  
 
Central Election Commission 
http://elections.uz/uzb  
 
























































QARSHI-KHANABAD (K-2) AIR BASE MAP 
 
Source: GlobalSecurityorg, www.globalsecurity.org/.../khanbad_overview.jpg  
